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I. INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear power has been met with criticism and skepticism 
almost since its inception. Despite extensive growth through the 
1960s and early 1970s, investment dropped off by 1976.1 Costly to 
construct and expensive to fuel, nuclear power plants are 
fundamentally at odds with existing economic forces. Although 
nuclear’s fiscal imprudence became exposed in the late Seventies,2 
investment and subsidization persist today. Even the plants that 
have been built have succumbed to economic pressure: “Existing 
nuclear plants are losing upwards of fifty million [dollars] per 
[plant per] year.”3 New York’s nuclear generators have experienced 
crippling profit losses, bringing several plants to the brink of 
closure.4 Natural gas is cheaper and more abundant. Renewable 
sources such as solar have gained significant traction. 
Nonetheless, in its Clean Energy Standard (“CES”), New York 
approved a subsidy program to keep these plants operating. In 
adopting the CES, the New York State Public Service Commission 
(“PSC”) carved out Tier 3, an “independent but related component 
of the CES” which specifically concerns the state’s nuclear 
 
1. NIGEL EVANS & CHRIS HOPE, NUCLEAR POWER: FUTURES, COSTS, AND 
BENEFITS 16 (1984).  
2.  See infra Part I, Section B. 
3.   Tim Echols, Nuclear Energy: Tastes like Chicken, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Sept. 
2016, at 56.  
4.   Patrick McGeehan, New York State Aiding Nuclear Plants with Millions in 
Subsidies, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/A22J-SMVZ. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/4
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facilities.5 Tier 3 appears counterproductive despite substantial 
political pressure to keep New York’s nuclear fleet online. 
In recent years, Governor Andrew Cuomo announced a push 
towards clean energy. The 2015 New York Energy Plan calls for 
50% of New York’s consumed energy to be sourced from carbon-
free generation, and to reduce the state’s greenhouse gas (“GHG”) 
emissions 40% by 2030.6 Nuclear generation is by far New York’s 
largest source of carbon-free generation. Currently, nuclear power 
represents 31% of the state’s total generation capacity.7 Renewable 
energy and efficiency advocates reluctantly support artificially 
sustaining nuclear power because these plants would most likely 
be replaced by natural gas, which would mean more carbon 
emissions. The fear is very real; after the 2014 closing of the 
Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Vermont, the New England 
Independent System Operator (“ISO-NE”) reported that when 
roughly five gigawatt-hours (“GWhs”) of nuclear generation was 
shut down, nearly six GWhs of natural gas generation took its 
place.8 
New York’s Tier 3 carve-out drew fierce legal opposition. 
Seventeen parties filed petitions for rehearing on the CES, of which 
nearly all were summarily rejected by the PSC.9 Ampersand 
Hydro, LLC, a conglomerate of hydropower stations, filed a 
procedural challenge, claiming that the PSC gave nuclear an 
unfair advantage and failed to explain why hydropower is 
ineligible.10 In response, the PSC agreed to review which sources 
will qualify for Zero Emission Credits (“ZECs”).11 Hudson River 
Sloop Clearwater and Goshen Green Farms, LLC jointly filed an 
Article 78 lawsuit against the PSC based on State Administrative 
Procedures Act (“SAPA”) violation claims, citing insufficient time 
 
5.   Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-E-0302 at 19 (N.Y. 
Pub. Serv. Comm’n. Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/8G2E-9AQ5 [hereinafter 
CES Order]. 
6.   N.Y. STATE ENERGY RESEARCH & DEV. AUTH., 2015 NEW YORK STATE ENERGY 
PLAN (2015), https://perma.cc/9244-CXGF.  
7.   CES Order, supra note 5, at 19. 
8.   James Conca, Natural Gas—Not Renewables—Is Replacing Nuclear Power, 
FORBES (May 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/YKD2-9QXY.  
9.   Gavin Bade, New York PSC Rejects Challenges to Nuclear Subsidy Program, 
UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 29, 2016), https://perma.cc/NDG4-46FZ.  
10.   Saqib Rahim, Challenge Looms for N.Y.’s Clean Energy Standard, E&E 
NEWS (Aug. 24, 2016), https://perma.cc/HQ45-L2XJ. 
11.   Bade, supra note 9. 
3
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for public comment on the CES.12 The gas industry raised concerns 
that New York’s actions strayed into federal jurisdiction: “the 
National Energy Marketers Association has argued that the 
nuclear supports are the same type of regulatory action invalidated 
by the Supreme Court in Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing.”13 
The Natural Gas Supply Association similarly concluded that the 
ZEC proposal intrudes into the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”).14 The overarching questions 
arising out of the challenge are: (1) What can a state do, as 
empowered by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, to 
influence the vitality of the market players of an industry? and (2) 
In the case of the energy industry, an industry with increasingly 
overlapping regulation at both the federal and state levels, at what 
point does state influence begin to conflict with the outer limits of 
federal preemption under the Commerce Clause? 
New York has not been the only state to tinker with nuclear 
subsidies in this fashion. Illinois also created a ZEC program, 
under the Future Energy Jobs Act, which was met with similar 
controversy.15 Both programs were challenged in federal district 
court—and both challenges have since been dismissed.16 In each 
case, the plaintiffs asserted that the state programs interfered 
with  federal wholesale rate-setting.17 Appeals have already been 
filed with the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals for the Illinois 
program, and the New York plaintiffs have indicated they intend 
to appeal as well.18 
 
12.   See Notice of Verified Article 78 and Declaratory Judgment Petition, Hudson 
River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 07242-16 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Nov. 30, 2016), https://perma.cc/6GDH-7THT. Hudson River Sloop 
Clearwater is an environmental activist organization dedicated to 
protecting the Hudson River. Id. at ¶ 36. Goshen Green Farms, LLC 
operates an organic farm within a fifty-mile radius of the Indian Point 
Nuclear Facility. Id. at ¶ 40. 
13.   Robert Walton, With Clean Energy Standard, New York Looks to Save 
Nukes, Skirt Legal Challenges, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 4, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/ZG2B-Y6UU.  
14.   Id. 
15.   See S.B. 2814, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016). 
16.   Peter Maloney, ZECs Appeal: Illinois, New York Nuclear Cases Could Shape 
Power Market Jurisdiction, UTIL. DIVE (July 31, 2017), 
https://perma.cc/NHW2-FSAD.  
17.   Id. 
18.   Id. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/4
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This Note seeks to make the argument for New York’s ZEC 
program as a legitimate exercise of state power. Part I provides 
context—the history of nuclear power, the rise and fall in the 
incidence of nuclear power projects, and why such investments are 
failing. Part II then provides an overview of the CES and the ZEC 
program contained therein. In Part III, the legal challenges filed 
in response to Tier 3 are discussed, as well as the Illinois case 
which parallels the conventional generator challenge in New York. 
Part III will also discuss relevant legal precedent the cases 
concern, namely the recent United States Supreme Court case, 
Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC.19 Part IV analyzes 
federal preemption to the extent it affects the New York program. 
This analysis mirrors—and in some areas, expands upon—the 
district court’s findings regarding New York’s program. Further, it 
compares similar crediting mechanisms currently used across the 
United States and other analogs demonstrating that, although 
federal preemption appears to control, there is significant room for 
the states to regulate. This Note ultimately concludes in Part V 
that the ZEC program is likely a legitimate exercise of state power, 
despite incidental effects it may have on related federal regulation. 
New York’s program is not vested in ignorance; most of the 
state’s nuclear fleet is drawing its last breath due to economic 
forces. The only plant that seemingly bucks this trend is the Indian 
Point Nuclear Energy Center, which provides power to New York 
City and Westchester County and has so far remained profitable.20 
The outlook for this profitability is marginal, and in the face of 
mounting political pressure from Governor Cuomo, Entergy, the 
plant’s owner and operator, recently agreed to a deal to cease 
generation by 2021.21 While the New York State government 
recognizes that the ZEC program is not a permanent solution, it is 
equally conscious of the reality that renewable energy is not yet 
ready to take nuclear’s place.22 Clean energy and the state doing 
its part in the fight against climate change are worthy policy goals. 
 
19.   136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
20.   Vivian Yee & Patrick McGeehan, Indian Point Nuclear Power Plant Could 
Close by 2021, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2017), https://perma.cc/GXG3-XV6X; 
Robert Walton, As Nuclear Plants Shutter, State Efforts to Save Them Are 
Coming Too Late, UTIL. DIVE (June 6, 2016), https://perma.cc/8TCB-U39C.  
21.   Yee & McGeehan, supra note 20. 
22.   CES Order, supra note 5, at 19.   
5
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Nonetheless, the intricate crisscross of state and federal purview 
over the energy industry compels the federal government to protect 
its place in the federalist regulatory scheme. New York’s 
aggressive ambitions for its nuclear fleet addresses the state’s 
energy problems but creates federal concern. 
II.   HISTORY OF NUCLEAR POWER IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Too Cheap to Meter: The Capital Investment 
Phenomenon 
In 1954, Lewis Strauss, then chairman of the now-defunct 
United States Atomic Energy Commission, gave a speech to a room 
of scientists, proclaiming that energy from nuclear plants would be 
“too cheap to meter.”23 Uranium, the fuel used to power nuclear 
plants, is immensely energy dense, more energy dense than other 
conventional fuels.24 Further, operating costs are relatively low 
compared to their fossil fuel counterparts. “In 2015, the national 
average total generating cost for nuclear energy was $35.50 per 
megawatt-hour (“MWh”).”25 For comparison, the Nuclear Energy 
Institute projects that combined-cycle gas-fired plants set to 
replace recently closed nuclear plants will have a levelized cost of 
over $70 per MWh.26 The levelized cost of energy (“LCOE”) is a 
summary measure of the overall competitiveness of certain energy 
sources, factoring in building and operating costs over an assumed 
 
23.  Abundant Power from Atom Seen: It Will Be Too Cheap for Our Children to 
Meter, Strauss Tells Science Writers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1954. The Atomic 
Energy Commission was created in 1946 to manage nuclear initiatives 
across the country, before being abolished by the Energy Reorganization Act 
of 1974 and later succeeded by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NRC 
Glossary: Atomic Energy Commission, U.S. NUCLEAR REG. COMM’N, 
https://perma.cc/QF8U-4RTM (last updated Apr. 10, 2017).  
24.   Karl S. Coplan, The Intercivilizational Inequities of Nuclear Power Weighed 
Against the Intergenerational Inequities of Carbon Based Energy, 17 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 227, 227 (2006). Uranium has an energy density of 
560,000 gigajoules per tonne, as compared to coal, for example, which is only 
27 gigajoules per tonne. Id. at n.1. 
25.  NUCLEAR ENERGY INST., NUCLEAR COSTS IN CONTEXT 2 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/2SUG-MMQ3.   
26.   Id. at 5. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/4
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plant lifetime.27 However, the 2016 LCOE estimated by the Energy 
Information Administration spells a less-optimistic account, 
exposing recent trends which indicate nuclear has and will 
continue to struggle to compete against natural gas or renewables 
like solar.28 
Utility companies were attracted to nuclear plants because 
they were literally the next “big thing.” Apart from the benefits, 
nuclear power plants were much larger and costlier to build than 
conventional plants. This provided the opportunity to further 
exploit a historical trend of increasing economies of scale in the 
industry. Utility companies operate as regulated monopolies over 
their respective territories under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”).29 
A simple formula was designed to determine how much a utility 
can charge its customers to both recover its costs as well turn a 
modest profit to attract investment, known as the revenue 
requirement: (Rate Base Investment × Rate of Return) + Operating 
Expenses = Revenue Requirement.30 Because the value of capital 
investment, but not operating expenses, is multiplied by the rate 
of return, utilities are incentivized to seek larger projects. This 
made nuclear the ideal candidate for investment when interest in 
the technology peaked in the aftermath of World War II. The first 
large-scale power plant in the United States opened its doors in 
1957, and by 1971, twenty-two power plants were fully operable.31 
Eight years later, this number skyrocketed to seventy-two.32 
B.   The Premature Decay of Nuclear Profit Margins 
Despite the optimism of the first few decades of nuclear power, 
“too cheap to meter” never came to fruition. By the mid-1980s, 
 
27.   U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., LEVELIZED COST AND LEVELIZED AVOIDED COST OF 
NEW GENERATION RESOURCES IN THE ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 1 
(2016), https://perma.cc/HY98-HUNM. 
28.  Id. The Energy Information Administration (“EIA”) calculated that 
“advanced nuclear” plants entering service in 2022 would cost $99.7 per 
MWh after available tax credits, versus $56.4 per MWh for Conventional 
Combined Cycle or $58.2 per MWh for Solar PV. Id. at 6.  
29.   See JIM LAZAR, ELECTRICITY REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 4 (2d ed. 2016), 
https://perma.cc/LUR2-538P. 
30.   Id. at 49, fig.8-1. 
31.  U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE HISTORY OF NUCLEAR ENERGY 17 (2016), 
https://perma.cc/UFL7-PRFL.   
32.   Id. at 18.  
7
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disasters at Three Mile Island domestically and Chernobyl abroad 
sparked skepticism, and economic failures became so apparent 
that the nation took notice. The reality is that nuclear plants “are 
fundamentally uneconomic,” and this fact began to surface for 
several reasons.33 As the country modernized, utilities expected 
corresponding increases in demand. A continuous increase did not 
occur, however, and so the extra capacity nuclear brought was not 
necessary.34 Further, additional costs were unexpectedly incurred 
due to rising interest rates and inflation.35 This created an 
exponential rise in building costs, due to the sheer scale of nuclear 
power plants.36 The trust in the economies of scale rationale was 
also misplaced; simply put, bigger stopped getting cheaper: 
Bigger plants turned out to be more costly [sic] in operation; their 
downtime and maintenance raised costs, and under new 
technologies, 50 to 150 megawatt plants wound up cheaper than 
500 megawatt plants. Many of today’s most expensive plants are 
nuclear plants built with very large overruns; between 1985 and 
1992, utilities had to write off at least $22.4 billion in nuclear plant 
investment.37 
The effectiveness of small plants had a direct effect on the 
financing of new nuclear projects. From 1981 to 1984, 77 gigawatts 
(“GW”) of nuclear plants (as well as some coal plants) were 
cancelled, and none were ordered as a replacement.38 Energy 
efficiency, ignored for over a century, became substantially more 
cost-effective than simply running the nuclear plants.39 Adopted 
efficient technology was capable of saving three-fourths of the 
electricity produced in 1985, which enabled utilities to pay off sunk 
 
33.   Letter from Amory B. Lovins, Chairman/Chief Scientist, Rocky Mountain 
Inst., to Forbes’s “Nuclear Follies” (Feb. 8, 1985) (on file with author) 
(emphasis in original). 
34.  John B. McArthur, Cost Responsibility or Regulatory Indulgence for 
Electricity’s Stranded Costs?, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 775, 823–24 (1998). 
35.   Id. at 823. 
36.   Id. 
37.   Id. at 823–24. 
38.   Lovins, supra note 33. 
39.   Id.; Energy efficiency is defined by the EIA as “using technology that 
requires less energy to perform the same function.” Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., https://perma.cc/TYH7-6K2A (last 
updated Dec. 15, 2016). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/4
  
2017] Armageddon 143 
costs while lowering consumer rates.40 These measures never went 
away, and now, not only is nuclear dethroned as the “future of 
electricity,” but newer or improving technologies are simply 
outpacing nuclear economically. 
Beyond the issues encountered in the eighties, nuclear power 
now faces increased competition from natural gas. With the 
maturation of fracking, “the real issue is persistently low natural 
gas prices, according to [Public Service Enterprise Group] 
President and CEO Ralph Izzo, whose company operates three 
nuclear plants.”41 Persistently low natural gas prices are crippling 
nuclear profits to the point of closure. Quad Cites, built in 1973, 
and Clinton, built in 1987, were both Illinois plants that were 
undercut by natural gas and failed to clear the PJM 
Interconnection capacity auction, prompting premature closure by 
their owner, Exelon.42 In the Northeast, Vermont Yankee has shut 
down, and Pilgrim Power Plant in Massachusetts is slated to close 
in 2019.43 Had New York not intervened, the R.E. Ginna, Nine 
Mile Point, and James A. FitzPatrick plants located in upstate 
New York all were anticipating closure.44 This has also dissuaded 
utilities from completing existing projects. Ratepayers could end 
up paying $2.5 billion for plants that never come to fruition 
because at least seven states allow utilities to expend certain costs 
prior to breaking ground.45 The only plants currently under 
construction are the Vogtle Plant and Virgil Summer Station in 
South Carolina.46 Both are behind schedule and over budget, 
amassing approximately $698 million in above-budget capital 
 
40.   Lovins, supra note 33. 
41.   Gavin Bade, Atoms for Green Energy: What Role Should Nuclear Power Play 
in Decarbonization?, UTIL. DIVE (July 21, 2016), https://perma.cc/AZA3-
W6M9. 
42.   Walton, supra note 20. PJM Interconnection LLC is a regional transmission 
organization that serves Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland, along 
with all or parts of other states throughout the Eastern United States. Who 
We Are, PJM INTERCONNECTION, https://perma.cc/N8CN-G4FV. 
43.   Walton, supra note 20. 
44.   Yee & McGeehan, supra note 20. 
45.   Peter Maloney, Bloomberg: Electric Customers Could Pay $2.5B for Unbuilt 
Nuclear Plants, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/4SLS-BVWJ.  
46.   Id. 
9
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costs.47 Exacerbating these problems is the recent bankruptcy of 
Westinghouse Electric. The company, which filed Chapter 11 in 
March of 2017, provided the reactor technology behind these plants 
and others and has maintained a considerable role in the nuclear 
power industry at large.48 “At the least, it is toxic news for the fate 
of the only nuclear projects to begin construction in the United 
States in three decades . . . . At the worst, Westinghouse’s collapse 
could spell the end of any nuclear build-out in the United States.”49 
In Illinois, the Exelon plants had held out hope that an ultimately 
failed legislative measure would have alleviated the economic toll, 
but the plants had been two of the best-performing in Exelon’s 
fleet—and they still lost a combined $800 million over the course 
of seven years.50 Lingering construction costs and other factors 
hamper the savings nuclear power would otherwise achieve, 
meaning higher market bids that competitors can beat.51 Without 
state aid, nuclear plants are simply succumbing to natural market 
forces. 
 
47.   Id. See also Herman K. Trabish, Nuclear Industry Darkened by Delays, Cost 
Overruns at Vogtle & Summer Facilities, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 24, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/Z5FV-SW9R. 
48.   Peter Maloney, Westinghouse Bankruptcy Could Grind US Nuclear Sector 
to a Halt, UTIL. DIVE (April 12, 2017), https://perma.cc/B5ZH-FGD8. 
49.   Id. 
50.   Press Release, Exelon Corp., Exelon Announces Early Retirement of Clinton 
and Quad Cities Nuclear Plants (June 2, 2016), https://perma.cc/V9SY-
CJGP. 
51.   Utility investments are recoverable under the existing regulatory 
framework employed in New York and across the United States. Capital 
investments and other expenditures are included in what is called the rate 
base, “the total of all long-lived investments made by the utility to serve 
consumers, net of accumulated depreciation. It includes buildings, power 
plants, fleet vehicles, office furniture, poles, wires, transformers, pipes, 
computers, and computer software.” LAZAR, supra note 29, at 51 (emphasis 
added). For assets to be recoverable, they must be “used and useful” and 
“prudently incurred.” Id. at 52. Typically, utilities enjoy a presumption of 
these factors. Id. Thus, when a capital-intense project such as a nuclear 
plant experiences overruns, utilities may charge customers to recover these 
expenses. Id. However, in the wholesale context, this means increasing the 
price to the point where nuclear energy becomes pricier than other sources. 
Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/4
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II. THE CLEAN ENERGY STANDARD AND THE ZEC 
PROGRAM 
On August 1, 2016, the New York State PSC issued an order 
adopting the CES.52 The CES coincides with a State Energy Plan 
goal that 50% of New York’s electricity be generated by renewable 
sources by 2030, in coordination with another statewide goal of a 
40% reduction in statewide GHG emissions by the same year.53 
The CES outlines six focus areas: 
(a) program and market structures to encourage consumer-
initiated clean energy purchases or investments; (b) obligations on 
load serving entities to financially support new renewable 
generation resources to serve their retail customers; (c) a 
requirement for regular renewable energy credit (REC) 
procurement solicitations; (d) obligations on distribution utilities 
on behalf of all retail customers to continue to financially support 
the maintenance of certain existing at-risk small hydro, wind and 
biomass generation attributes; (e) a program to maximize the 
value potential of new offshore wind resources; and (f) obligations 
on load serving entities to financially support the preservation of 
existing at-risk nuclear zero-emissions attributes to serve their 
retail customers.54 
To that end, the CES establishes three tiered components. Tier 
1 imposes an obligation on all load-serving entities (“LSEs”) to 
procure new renewable resources (evidenced by obtaining RECs) 
to account for a certain percentage of the total load served.55 Tier 
2 adopts a maintenance program outlined under the existing 
Renewable Portfolio Standard (“RPS”).56 Tier 3 governs the 
nuclear subsidy program.57 
The order sites multiple justifications for its program. Nuclear 
represents 31% of the state’s total generation, and it offsets nearly 
fifteen million tons of carbon dioxide (“CO2”) per year.58 Germany, 
despite its aggressive adoption of solar generation, observed an 
 
52.   CES Order, supra note 5, at 1. 
53.   Id. at 2. 
54.   Id.  
55.   Id. at 14. 
56.   Id. at 18. 
57.   Id. at 19. 
58.   Id. 
11
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increase in carbon emissions in the form of added coal plants when 
it abruptly shut down all its nuclear plants.59 New York seeks to 
avoid a similar outcome with natural gas plants.60 This will be 
accomplished with the ZEC scheme. The New York State Energy 
Research and Development Authority (“NYSERDA”) will offer 
multiyear contracts that demonstrate public necessity, for a 
contract period from April 1, 2017 through March 31, 2029.61 The 
ZEC price will initially be set at $17.48 per MWh for two years and 
will then be adjusted based on the social cost of carbon.62 ZEC 
pricing was set by the PSC, rather than determined by competition 
and other market forces, because there are too few owners of 
affected nuclear facilities, meaning an overly influential command 
of market power amongst them.63 The social cost of carbon is an 
estimate of the economic damages associated with a small increase 
in CO2 emissions—conventionally, one metric ton—in a given 
year.64 The social cost of carbon includes climate change damages 
such as “agricultural productivity, human health, property 
damages from increased flood risk, and changes in energy system 
costs . . . . However, given current modeling and data limitations, 
it does not include all important damages,” such as currently 
incalculable ones.65 
The Order bases its methodology on public necessity. Beyond 
the environmental consequences of losing the avoidance of over 15 
million tons of CO2 emissions, shutting down New York’s nuclear 
plants would create other issues. For example, reduced fuel 
 
59.   Id. 
60.   Id.  
61.   Id. at 19–20. 
62.   Id. at 19–20, 49. 
63.   Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-E-0302, app. E, at 4 
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n. Aug. 1, 2016), https://perma.cc/NZG6-G4JZ 
[hereinafter Appendix E]. 
64.  The Social Cost of Carbon, EPA (Jan. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/UDF8-
B2MA.  
65.   Id. See generally PETER HOWARD, OMITTED DAMAGES: WHAT’S MISSING FROM 
THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON (2014), https://perma.cc/Q92N-YXTE. The Cost 
of Carbon Project, a joint project of the Environmental Defense Fund, the 
Institute for Policy Integrity, and the Natural Resources Defense Council, 
addresses what it perceives to be shortcomings of the social cost of carbon, 
finding missing or poorly quantified damages in areas such as “hot spot 
damages including increases in forced migration, social and political conflict, 
and violence; weather variability and extreme weather events; and declining 
growth rates,” among other impacts. Id. at 1.  
12https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss1/4
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diversity (due to the anticipated heavier reliance on fossil-fuel-
based energy should nuclear plants close) could also affect system 
reliability and price stability due to the inherent volatility of 
natural gas prices, rendering consumers susceptible to rate 
shock.66 “Public necessity” will be determined on a plant-specific 
basis at the discretion of the PSC based on several factors: 
(a) the verifiable historic contribution the facility has made to the 
clean energy resource mix consumed by retail consumers in New 
York State regardless of the location of the facility; (b) the degree 
to which energy, capacity and ancillary services revenues 
projected to be received by the facility are at a level that is 
insufficient to provide adequate compensation to preserve the 
zero-emission environmental values or attributes historically 
provided by the facility; (c) the costs and benefits of such a 
payment for zero-emissions attributes for the facility in relation to 
other clean energy alternatives for the benefit of the electric 
system, its customers and the environment; (d) the impacts of such 
costs on ratepayers; and (e) the public interest.67 
This effectively excludes Indian Point, the largest nuclear 
plant in New York, which has managed to avoid the economic 
difficulties of its upstate counterparts.68 Located in Southern New 
York just outside New York City, it enjoys higher energy prices, 
meaning greater profitability than the other plants which serve 
rural, less densely populated areas.69 Nonetheless, the 
Department of Public Service Staff included in Appendix E of the 
CES Order a section specifically directed at Indian Point, 
essentially vowing to include the plant in New York’s CES should 
the need arise.70 In return, eligible facilities must produce to meet 
 
66.  CES Order, supra note 5, at 19. The order also warns of additional 
“significant adverse economic impacts” of nuclear plant closure but does not 
delve into what those consist of with any specificity. Id.   
67.   Appendix E, supra note 63, at 2. 
68.   See id. at 2–4. 
69.   Jessica Bayles, New York Creates New Emissions Credit for Nuclear Plants, 
NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/9RMH-56KH.  
70.  Appendix E, supra note 63, at 9–10. The Department of Public Service 
(“DPS”) is the agency arm of the PSC, see generally Department of Public 
Service - Our Mission, N.Y.S. PUB. SERV. COMM’N , https://perma.cc/9D6F-
9RN3, and are authors of the CES Order, see CES Order, supra note 5, at 
11. Within the CES order and others issued by the PSC, the DPS staff are 
often simply referred to as “staff.” See CES Order, supra note 5, at 11.  
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an obligation within a group (that is, each facility will contribute 
to an overall target set for a specified group of facilities), as well as 
under both group and individual MWh caps for each tranche 
period.71 Should a facility fail to meet its part of the group 
obligation, the cap will be reduced as a financial penalty.72 The 
amount of ZECs to be purchased each year, with each ZEC 
denominated by the MWh, will also be capped. Initially, the 
statewide cap is to be set at 27,618,000 MWh annually.73 This is 
representative of the “historic contribution the facilities have made 
to the clean energy resource mix,” and Appendix E lays out criteria 
for changing the cap should the ownership of FitzPatrick change.74 
This change in ownership did in fact occur in August of 2016 when 
Exelon, owner of the other upstate nuclear plants, agreed to 
purchase the FitzPatrick facility.75 Accordingly, the caps will now 
be combined and treated as a single group.76 
III. THE LEGALITY OF THE ZEC PROGRAM 
A. Legal Challenges by Other Players in the New 
York Energy Industry 
While nuclear plant owners breathed sighs of relief after the 
ZEC program’s adoption, the groundbreaking initiative was not 
without controversy. Hydropower stations have filed a procedural 
challenge, claiming that the PSC has given nuclear an unfair 
advantage and failed to explain why hydropower is ineligible.77 
Gas, oil, and coal generators were dealt a blow in their lawsuit, 
which alleged that the subsidies intrude on federal jurisdiction, 
 
71.   Appendix E, supra note 63, at 2–5. A “tranche” is defined as “an issue of 
bonds derived from a pooling of like obligations that is differentiated from 
other issues especially by maturity or rate of return.” Tranche, MERRIAM-
WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2017), https://perma.cc/P76K-3CH7.  
72.   Appendix E, supra note 63, at 3. 
73.   Id. at 9.  
74.   Id. 
75.   Robert Walton, Exelon to Buy Entergy’s Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant in $110M 
Deal, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/DY9Q-86E8.  
76.   Appendix E, supra note 63, at 9. 
77.   Rahim, supra note 10. 
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when the Southern District of New York granted the motions to 
dismiss.78 
Ampersand Hydro, LLC operates twelve small hydropower 
stations within the state.79 The company filed for a rehearing on 
procedural grounds, essentially seeking equal treatment.80 Like 
nuclear, hydropower is a zero-carbon energy source, and 
hydropower plants are similarly facing deficiencies warranting 
closure.81 However, hydropower plants are clearly excluded under 
Tier 3.82 The Order goes so far as to define “Zero Carbon Electric 
Generating Facility” as an “electric generating facility that uses 
energy released in the course of nuclear fission to generate 
electricity.”83 The PSC chose the zero-carbon language to refer to 
nuclear-sourced energy, rather than just the term “nuclear power” 
itself, likely for the same reason Ampersand Hydro is challenging 
it: choosing one type of generator over others comes dangerously 
close to being arbitrary and capricious without appropriate 
justification for the discrimination.84 
The conventional generator challenge is another matter, 
having raised multiple issues. FERC utilizes an auction-based 
scheme to ensure wholesale rates are just and reasonable.85 The 
claimants argued that, in carving out a subsidy program for 
nuclear power, New York is essentially ignoring the auction 
results—that the plants either fail to clear the auction (meaning 
their price is too high to be accepted by wholesale purchasers under 
the FERC scheme) or are undercut by competition and are thus 
 
78.   Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 16-CV-8164, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116140 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2017); Robert Walton, Generators: New 
York Nuclear Subsidies Defy FERC Jurisdiction, Supreme Court decision, 
UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 20, 2016), https://perma.cc/WZ43-F3C5.  
79.   Rahim, supra note 10. 
80.   Id. 
81.   Id. 
82.  See CES Order, supra note 5, at 33. (Although hydropower is discussed 
throughout the order, it makes no references to the energy source when 
outlining the subsidy program under Tier 3. See id.) 
83.   Appendix E, supra note 63, at 1 (emphasis added). 
84.   Rahim, supra note 10. A lack of a reasonable rationale for discrimination 
would likely expose an order to judicial review under the State 
Administrative Procedures Act.  See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 
2006). 
85.   Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291–92 (2016). 
15
  
150 Pace Environmental Law Review [Vol. 35 
losing profits by federal design.86 Second, the claimants asserted 
that retail ratepayers will unfairly be forced to fund the 
“artificially depress[ed]” wholesale market prices.87 Such prices 
could be an estimated $7.6 billion over the next twelve years, and 
if the FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant is sold, the entire subsidy 
would most likely go to a single company.88 Third, claimants cited 
the federal preemption doctrine and the dormant Commerce 
Clause because the subsidies only relate to wholesale production.89 
Predating the New York challenge are the cases of Village of 
Old Mill Creek v. Star and Electric Power Supply Association v. 
Star.90 These companion cases, dismissed by the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois, involved challenges to a 
similar ZEC program in Illinois based on federal preemption and 
the dormant Commerce Clause. Finding that the claims were, “in 
large part, not justiciable,” the court nonetheless held that the 
generator plaintiffs adequately established standing to challenge 
the program in part.91 The assertions were nearly identical to those 
later claimed in New York—and were all summarily dismissed. 
The court found that “the ZEC program falls within Illinois’s 
reserved authority over generation facilities,” and that the “alleged 
harm to out-of-state power generators . . . is not clearly excessive 
when balanced against these weighty and traditional areas of 
 
86.   See Complaint at 1–2, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 16-CV-
8164, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116140 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2017) [hereinafter 
Complaint]. 
87.   Id. at *5. 
88.  Id. at *2. The complaint refers to a now-confirmed sale of FitzPatrick to 
Exelon, which already owned the other two upstate power plants. See James 
Conca, Exelon Buys Fitzpatrick Nuclear Plant, Setting the Standard for U.S. 
Carbon Goals, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/HB8Y-848M.  
89.   Complaint, supra note 86, at 5–6. The FPA explicitly authorizes FERC alone 
to regulate interstate sale and transmission of electric energy, thus 
including wholesale rate-setting. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) 
(2012). Therefore, claimants argue either that FERC, not the states, 
explicitly wields the authority to subsidize in this manner, or, alternatively, 
that the dormant Commerce Clause inherently grants the power to the 
federal government and, by extension, FERC. Complaint, supra note 86, at 
5–6; see English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–80 (1990) (holding that 
an employee’s state tort claim was not sufficiently related to the operation 
of a nuclear facility to fall within the preempted field of nuclear safety under 
the Supremacy Clause). 
90.   No. 17-CV-1163 and 17-CV-1164, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109368 (N.D. Ill. 
July 14, 2017). These cases were consolidated. 
91.   Id. at *18.  
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permissible state regulation.”92 Less than two weeks later, the 
Southern District of New York echoed the Northern District of 
Illinois’s dismissal.93 The court rejected the plaintiff’s claims that 
the ZEC program was “tethered” to the wholesale auction and thus 
invalid under Hughes94: “A whole host of measures that States 
might employ to encourage clean energy development . . . involve 
propping up the operation of a generator that might otherwise be 
unprofitable. Hughes did not prohibit such state assistance.”95 
There are several reasons why the two district courts correctly 
concluded that the ZEC programs are legitimate exercises of state 
power. It is evident Hughes does not preclude state assistance to 
particular generators, nor does the Commerce Clause prohibit the 
incidental consequences such actions have on the wholesale 
market. 
B. The Federal Framework and Hughes 
FERC wields substantial authority over the electric industry, 
inherent in the FPA and, in turn, based on Congress’s authority to 
regulate interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause.96 
Writing on the relationship between the energy industry and 
interstate commerce, the Supreme Court noted: “[I]t is difficult to 
conceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than 
electric energy, a product used in virtually every home and every 
commercial or manufacturing facility. No State relies solely on its 
own resources in this respect.”97 Nonetheless, Congress specifically 
delegated regulatory authority over retail rates to the states.98 The 
incongruity of this approach has been the subject of judicial debate 
for decades because wholesale and retail rates are “inextricably 
 
92.   Id. at *33, *40. 
93.  Gavin Bade, Federal Court Throws out Challenge to New York Nuclear 
Subsidies, UTIL. DIVE (July 25, 2017), https://perma.cc/S874-G7KK.  
94.   Coal. for Competitive Elec., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116140, at *18.   
95.   Id. 
96.   U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
97.   FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). See also Fed. Power Comm’n 
v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 404 U.S. 453, 461 (1972). 
98.  16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
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linked.”99 Thus, unsurprisingly, this linkage spills over into the 
distributed generation context.100 
Maryland twice demonstrated its dissatisfaction with this 
FERC scheme with actions at issue in Hughes.101 Part of the 
auction scheme involves a “New Entry Price Adjustment” 
(“NEPA”).102 This guarantees new generators a stable capacity 
price for the first three years to prevent such entry from lowering 
the clearing price to the point that that generator cannot recover 
its costs.103 The first instance of Maryland’s opposition to FERC’s 
scheme came in a tariff-setting proceeding for PJM 
Interconnection (a regional transmission organization whose grid 
encompasses the state of Maryland).104 Several parties, including 
the state commission, argued for extending the NEPA duration 
from three to ten years.105 Although FERC noted that longer 
commitment periods have a positive influence on the financing 
process of new generation projects, it ultimately rejected the 
proposal.106 FERC stated that: 
PJM’s proposal would further bifurcate capacity markets by giving 
new suppliers longer payments and assurances unavailable to 
existing suppliers providing the same service. Thus, it would 
result in further price discrimination between existing resources, 
including demand response, and new generation suppliers . . . . 
[W]e must therefore balance the benefits of the longer commitment 
period (to the extent it fosters new entry by making project 
financing easier or cheaper) against the possible uplift payments 
in excess of auction clearing prices that loads may have to bear due 
 
99.   FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 766 (2016). 
100. “Distributed generation refers to a variety of technologies that generate 
electricity at or near where it will be used, such as solar panels and combined 
heat and power.” Distributed Generation of Electricity and its 
Environmental Impacts, EPA, https://perma.cc/G8KK-KKAQ (last updated 
Jan. 24, 2017).  
101. 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). 
102. Id. at 1294. NEPA is often used in the energy context to refer to new entry 
price adjustments, not to be confused with the National Environmental 
Policy Act. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. The parties also discussed both a five- and seven-year period in 
settlement proposals. See generally PJM Interconnection, LLC, 126 FERC ¶ 
61,275 (2009). 
106. PJM Interconnection, LLC, 126 FERC at ¶ 62,563. 
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an [sic] extension of the NEPA term. In our view, no party has 
made the case that extending the NEPA term to five or seven years 
strikes a superior balance to the existing provisions.107 
After FERC’s rejection of the NEPA proposal, the Maryland 
Public Service Commission (“MPSC”) promulgated the generation 
order at issue in Hughes.108 It required LSEs to enter into a 
twenty-year “contract for difference” which, unlike a traditional 
bilateral contract, did not transfer ownership of capacity.109 
Instead, the generator is guaranteed the contract price, with the 
LSE paying “the difference between the contract price and the 
clearing price,” should the clearing price fall below the contracted 
amount.110 In practice, the contract for differences effectively 
created an artificial seventeen-year NEPA extension.111 The 
Supreme Court found the Maryland regulation invalid on 
preemption grounds112: “[S]tate laws are preempted when they 
‘den[y] full effect to the rates set by FERC, even though [they do] 
not seek to tamper with the actual terms of an interstate 
transaction.’”113 This begs the question: To what degree can a state 
regulate when a byproduct of such regulation conflicts with federal 
jurisdiction? 
The Hughes Court even noted that the decision should not be 
read as a rigid barrier to state efforts to support new or existing 
generation.114 While not directly stated, it appears intent plays a 
role in determining the permissibility of a program: “States, of 
course, may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them 
even when their laws incidentally affect areas within FERC’s 
 
107. Id.  
108. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294.  
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1295. 
111. Id. at 1296–97. 
112. Id. at 1298. 
113. Id. at 1296 (citing PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 476 (4th 
Cir. 2014)). 
114. Id. at 1300 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In her concurrence, Justice 
Sotomayor cautions that the courts “must be careful not to confuse the 
‘congressionally designed interplay between state and federal regulation,’ 
for impermissible tension that requires pre-emption under the Supremacy 
Clause.” Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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domain.”115 Summarily, Hughes echoed the sentiment of the Court 
in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg that “State[s] 
must . . . give effect to Congress’[s] desire to give FERC plenary 
authority over interstate wholesale rates, and to ensure that the 
States do not interfere with this authority.”116 The wholesale 
auction scheme employed by FERC is designed to fulfill its 
statutory mandate that costs be “just and reasonable.”117 While 
costs are sufficiently regulated in this manner, the states’ 
environmental and reliability concerns are left unconsidered; such 
concerns are not factored into the equation.118 
IV. CAN NEW YORK STATE REGULATE NUCLEAR 
POWER OUT OF ITS ECONOMIC FAILURE? 
A. Federal Preemption Does Not Go So Far as to 
Prevent State Action that Has an Incidental Effect 
on Federal Authority over Wholesale Markets 
In light of its successful motion to dismiss in Coalition for 
Competitive Electricity, New York firmly believes its programs 
avoid federal preemption issues. Audrey Zibelman, then 
Chairwoman of the PSC, described the lawsuit as “frivolous” and 
simply a political move.119 “The Supreme Court has repeatedly 
upheld the rights of states to protect their environment for the 
welfare of citizens,” she added.120 The PSC also disputes the suit’s 
 
115. Id. at 1298. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015) 
(holding that state gas price manipulation which incidentally affected 
wholesale rates was not preempted by the Natural Gas Act). 
116. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986). 
117. 16. U.S.C. § 824d(a). 
118. Emily Hammond, Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s 
Jurisdictional Boundaries – Take Three, GEO. WASH. L. REV. DOCKET (Apr. 
22, 2016), https://perma.cc/7WA8-KL2J.  
119. Jesse McKinley, Lawsuit Seeks to Halt New York Subsidies for Upstate 
Nuclear Plants, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2016), https://perma.cc/2ZSF-EKZW. 
Audrey Zibelman has since stepped down, leaving the PSC to oversee the 
Australian Energy Market Operator on March 20th. Krysti Shallenberger, 
New York PSC Chair Zibelman to Leave for Australian Grid Operator in 
March, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/4F6J-PFY.  
120. McKinley, supra note 119. See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007) (holding that numerous states and several cities had standing to 
compel federal regulation of GHGs as pollutants based on the alleged harm 
coastal jurisdictions endure from climate-change-induced sea-level rise); 
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alleged cost estimates, claiming that the financial impact would be 
“less than $2 per month for a typical residential customer.”121 
While Hughes certainly reinforces the notion that a state cannot 
directly interfere with FERC wholesale rates, it is equally clear 
that any state action in the energy industry will have at least an 
incidental impact on the wholesale market. For example, the FPA 
leaves siting decisions exclusively to states.122 Assuming New York 
allows the upstate nuclear plants to close, it would have rather 
unfettered discretion in deciding how to replace them. Although 
unrealistic and subject to challenge, New York could approve a 
new, larger nuclear plant to take its place, with capital costs being 
recoverable by retail consumers. This hypothetical scenario would 
potentially rival—if not exceed—the costs of the ZEC subsidies. 
States have interests beyond price-setting when siting a 
particular plant. These interests do not disappear after the plant 
is sited and certainly play a role in keeping the plant afloat amidst 
economic troubles. Furthermore, a decision to shut down a nuclear 
plant, such as Indian Point, impacts wholesale rates when the 
plant goes offline; the plant’s substantial power contribution to the 
auction stack disappears and must be replaced by other—and 
potentially more expensive—means of generation. Using Indian 
Point as an example, many in New York are concerned about how 
its generational footprint will be replaced. The New York Times 
reported that potential options include Canadian hydropower—a 
glaring example of how the energy industry traverses territorial 
borders irrespective of the their role in compartmentalizing 
regulatory authority.123 In turn, interstate commerce is almost 
inevitably impacted by the major shifts in New York’s energy 
production. 
Yet, such an impact would not be considered an intrusion on 
federal authority. Jurisprudence has demonstrated a federal 
respect for state actions which result in incidental effects on the 
wholesale energy market.124 Furthermore, it has led to arguments 
 
Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907) (holding that in their 
role as “quasi-sovereign[s],” the states have an interest “independent of and 
behind the titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain”). 
121. McKinley, supra note 119.  
122. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). 
123. Yee & McGeehan, supra note 20.   
124. See Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S. 493, 493 
(1989) (holding that the state’s regulation governing the timing of natural 
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that dual sovereignty principles regarding energy market 
regulation (namely the FPA’s division of authority over wholesale 
and retail rates to FERC and the states, respectively) have eroded 
since their conception in the New Deal era.125 After competition 
was reintroduced to the energy market, coupled with the onset of 
new technologies, the once-bright lines between federal and state 
authority blurred, leading to increased conflicts and litigation.126 
Adhering to an outdated, rigid scheme, rather than acknowledging 
the unavoidable interplay between federal and state power: 
hamstrings agency regulators from adopting proactive regulatory 
approaches that can adapt as they seek to balance important goals 
in the regulation of energy markets, such as expanding clean-
energy resources, integrating those resources into the grid, 
protecting reliability, addressing energy security, and monitoring 
anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to consumers.127 
The most troublesome of these principles in the modern era is 
likely field preemption; “[o]ne of the highest profile modern 
endorsements of field preemption is in the context of nuclear 
regulation.”128 In New York v. FERC, the Supreme Court noted 
that, when reviewing field preemption claims, it is appropriate to 
begin with “the assumption that the historic police powers of the 
States were not to be superseded . . . unless that was the clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress.”129 This police power is derived from 
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution, included in the powers 
reserved to the states.130 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court was 
hesitant to apply a “presumption against pre-emption” when FERC 
 
gas production violated neither the Supremacy nor the Commerce Clauses); 
see also Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 754 F.2d 99, 105 
(2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a state’s practice of imputing incidental sales in 
a utility’s revenue base to determine tariff change benefits did not violate 
the Supremacy Clause).  
125. Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV. 399, 
402–03 (2016). 
126. Id. at 402. 
127. Id. at 402–03. 
128. Id. at 417. 
129. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002) (citing Hillsborough Cty. v. 
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
130. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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strayed into the retail sphere with Order No. 888.131 It is thus clear 
that the courts still maintain the position that regulation of the 
energy market is largely within FERC’s control; however, the 
reasoning has shifted from dual sovereignty to principles arising 
out of FERC’s statutory mandates. When faced with petitioners’ 
argument for a clear division of authority in natural gas 
regulation, the majority in ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc. opined that 
the “[p]latonic ideal does not describe the natural gas regulatory 
world.”132 In rejecting the argument for exclusive federal control 
over pipelines in ONEOK, the Supreme Court demonstrated an 
unwillingness to apply field preemption to matters not purely 
wholesale in nature.133 A year later, Justice Kagan directly 
displaced dual sovereignty in favor of a pragmatic analysis based 
on FERC’s “just and reasonable” obligations.134 Although both 
ONEOK and EPSA upheld FERC’s actions where intrusion into 
state jurisdiction was in question, the Supreme Court did so 
without relying on field preemption. 
Furthermore, these decisions do not stray from a perceivable 
Congressional intent to the contrary. Even in 1935, the Senate 
Report accompanying the FPA noted that subsection (a) “declares 
the policy of Congress to extend that regulation to those matters 
which cannot be regulated by the States and to assist the States in 
the exercise of their regulatory powers.”135 The House reported 
similar sentiments, elaborating further that “[the FPA] is 
conceived entirely as a supplement to, and not a substitute for, 
State regulation.”136 The overwhelming support for concurrent 
jurisdiction, rather than dual sovereignty, limits the applicability 
of field preemption to state subsidy of nuclear plants. 
When combined with concurrent jurisdiction principles, 
Hughes supports the notion that New York’s ZEC program escapes 
field preemption. The Second Circuit was the first to address 
Hughes and its scope, applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning to 
a preemption challenge against the Connecticut Department of 
 
131. FERC, 535 U.S. at 17. Order No. 888 imposed an open access requirement 
on unbundled retail transmissions. Id. at 11. 
132. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1601 (2015) (citation omitted). 
133. Rossi, supra note 125, at 432. 
134. Id. at 434; EPSA, 136 S. Ct. 760, 767–68 (2016).  
135. S. REP. NO. 74-621, at 48 (1935) (emphasis added). 
136. H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 8 (1935). 
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Energy and Environmental Protection (“DEEP”) in Allco Finance 
Ltd. v. Klee.137 Allco owns and operates several solar projects 
throughout the country.138 It alleged that DEEP’s solicitation 
process for solar project proposals (which did not select any Allco 
proposal, giving rise to the suit) under the 2013 Act Concerning 
Connecticut’s Clean Energy Goals was preempted by federal 
law.139 In affirming the lower court’s dismissal, the Second Circuit 
found that DEEP’s request for proposals were “precisely what the 
Hughes Court placed outside its limited holding.”140 In contrast to 
Maryland’s program, DEEP Commissioner Klee was simply 
authorized to guide—but not compel—utilities to enter into 
bilateral contract agreements with generators. This lack of 
compulsion—that is, a lack of direct interference (such as that 
observed in Hughes)—renders a state action in this field 
permissible.141 
Although state laws are preempted when they “den[y] full 
effect to the rates set by FERC, even though they do not seek to 
tamper with the actual terms of an interstate transaction,”142 in 
this case, New York is regulating the attribute, rather than the 
energy production. Nuclear plants are wholesale market 
participants, meaning that the energy they produce and sell is 
regulated at the federal level. However, New York created a credit 
for the type of energy it produces, rather than the energy itself. 
This does not (on its face) alter the price a nuclear plant can take 
to market. 
B. ZECs are Separable as a Commodity from the 
Energy Produced by Nuclear Plants 
Commissioner Zibelman also defended the credits as “designed 
to value only the carbon-free attributes of the energy, and not the 
actual power.”143 While that may be true, assigning the attribute 
 
137. 861 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2017). 
138. Id. at 89. 
139. Id. at 86. 
140. Id. at 99. 
141. Id. The Second Circuit also noted that the DEEP-directed contracts were 
ultimately subject to FERC review, further legitimizing Connecticut’s 
program. Id. at 99–100. 
142. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 476 (4th Cir. 2014). 
143. Walton, supra note 78.   
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value nonetheless arguably influences the wholesale auction. 
Despite not actually changing the cost of the nuclear-produced 
energy, the plants will remain able to enter the auction, preventing 
additional generators—new or existing—from otherwise filling out 
the “auction stack.”144 Regardless, this incidental effect cannot be 
misinterpreted as running afoul of FERC’s authority, as portrayed 
in Hughes. In Hughes, Maryland deliberately meddled with FERC 
authority by providing new generators with the state’s contract for 
difference.145 New York’s actions are easily distinguishable 
because the valuation of ZECs is unaffected by the prices offered 
at auction, rather than dependent on a predetermined figure, as in 
Hughes. ZECs can be treated as a separate commodity, further 
solidifying New York’s actions as permissible. In fact, FERC has 
recognized that environmental attributes in the form of RECs can 
be traded separately and are not necessarily bound to or conveyed 
with the “energy or capacity” generators produce—and that logic 
is likewise applicable to the zero-carbon attribute of nuclear 
power.146 FERC later declared and cemented its position on RECs 
with an order in 2003 and a denial of a request for rehearing in 
2004.147 
To refute the distinction between the Maryland and New York 
approaches despite the divisibility of the zero-carbon attribute and 
the energy itself, would essentially be to argue that nuclear facility 
operators cannot engage in any commercial activity for fear of 
reducing overhead to the point that the operators may lower their 
wholesale bids. Imagine a pizzeria selling pizzas valued at $5. If 
the pizzeria is failing, Maryland would give the pizzeria $2 per pie, 
if the store can only manage to sell them at $3. New York would 
allow the pizzeria to charge $2 to certify that the pizza dough is 
 
144. Auction stacks are how generators enter the wholesale capacity auction. See 
Adam James, How a Capacity Market Works, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE (June 
14, 2013), https://perma.cc/A74F-P3E7. These markets are “forward 
looking,” with generators being compensated for the amount of power they 
can provide for a specified time period. Id. Each generator bids based on its 
operation costs, which then “stack” from lowest to highest. Id. However, once 
capacity is reached, each bidder receives the “clearing price,” or the highest 
price necessary to meet demand. Id. 
145. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1295 (2016).  
146. Am. Ref-Fuel Co., Covanta Energy Grp., Montenay Power Corp., & 
Wheelabrator Tech. Inc., 105 FERC ¶ 61,004 (2003). 
147. TODD JONES ET AL., THE LEGAL BASIS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES, 
CENT. FOR RESOURCE SOLUTIONS 4 (2015), https://perma.cc/2EMJ-REPQ.  
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organically sourced, regardless of what price at which it sells the 
actual pie. Monetizing perceived benefits as a separate revenue 
stream sufficiently departs from rate-setting to not be considered 
an intrusion on FERC authority. To argue the contrary would be 
logically akin to prohibiting a nuclear plant from selling pizza in 
addition to its energy production out of fear that its added revenue 
(which is separate from its energy production revenue) will grant 
an unfair advantage at auction. 
C. Existing REC and SREC Programs Legitimize New 
York’s ZEC Credit Scheme 
The ZEC program bears striking similarities to its REC 
counterpart. A renewable energy credit, also referred to as a 
renewable energy certificate, is defined by the EPA as “a market-
based instrument that represents the property rights to the 
environmental, social and other non-power attributes of renewable 
electricity generation.”148 Under the CES Order, like ZECs, LSEs 
must meet certain renewable obligations and can purchase RECs 
from NYSERDA, with the same goals of reducing carbon emissions 
and achieving 50% clean energy by 2030.149 RECs are not unique 
to New York; they are recognized federally as well in thirty-six 
states.150 Besides FERC, the Department of Energy, the Federal 
Energy Management Program, and the White House Council on 
Environmental Quality (under the Obama Administration) all 
have recognized RECs as a legitimate means of valuating the non-
energy attributes of energy generation, and that such attributes 
can be sold separately.151 Furthermore, without RECs (and in the 
case of nuclear, ZECs), there are few means available to track 
where electricity comes from when a consumer turns on a light;152 
“[o]nce renewable electricity is introduced into the grid, it is 
physically indistinguishable from electricity generated from 
conventional sources.”153 Courts have also endorsed RECs by 
 
148. EPA, RENEWABLE ENERGY CERTIFICATES (RECS), https://perma.cc/Q92G-
CGJY (last updated September 8, 2017).  
149. CES Order, supra note 5, at 16, 18. 
150. JONES ET AL., supra note 147, at 3. 
151. Id. at 5. 
152. Id. at 6. 
153. Id.  
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treating them as a form of property.154 Notably, the Second Circuit 
recognized the following: 
Generally speaking, RECs are inventions of state property law 
whereby the renewable energy attributes are “unbundled” from 
the energy itself and sold separately. The credits can be purchased 
by companies and individuals to offset use of energy generated 
from traditional fossil fuel resources or by government agencies to 
satisfy certain requirements that these agencies purchase a 
certain percentage of their energy from renewable sources.155 
RECs have been endorsed by multiple agencies and courts at the 
federal and state levels. Certifying non-energy attributes is a time-
tested, legitimate means of subsidy, and New York’s ZECs are no 
exception. 
Zero-carbon can certainly be included in the non-power 
category of attributes which RECs otherwise provide value for and 
track. However, there is no “rule” that prohibits “spinning-off” this 
attribute into another form of certificate, as New York has done 
with Tier 3. In fact, states have done just that with Solar 
Renewable Energy Credits (“SRECs”). SRECs “represent the 
generation attributes of solar energy systems” specifically.156 
SREC markets exist in nine states and Washington, D.C., designed 
to meet various RPS in these jurisdictions.157 In at least one 
instance, a federal court has acknowledged SRECs—meaning that 
their inclusion in discussions of non-energy attribute valuation 
legitimizes them for the same, widely accepted reasons supporting 
RECs.158 While one can argue that making these credits too 
particularized may lead to tracking and accounting issues, no 
federal statute or regulation has yet to define how far states may 
 
154. Id. at 5. Both the Superior Court of New Jersey as well as the Connecticut 
Supreme Court have recognized that RECs are “property” and that they 
effectively “‘unbundle[ ]’ the renewable energy attribute of the electric 
product from the generic energy component for accounting purposes and 
allow[ ] them to be traded separately.” Id. (citations omitted). 
155. Id. (citing Wheelabrator Libson, Inc. v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control, 
531 F.3d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 2008)) (emphasis added). 
156. LORI BIRD ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, SOLAR RENEWABLE ENERGY 
CERTIFICATE (SREC) MARKETS: STATUS AND TRENDS 1 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/WY52-PKUA. 
157. See id. at 7.  
158. Nichols v. Markell, No. 12-777-CJB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52976, at *4 (D. 
Del. Apr. 17, 2014). 
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go in isolating and propping up favorable non-energy attributes 
over one another. It follows that, like SRECs, New York’s use of 
ZECs is acceptable because state property law justifies certifying 
non-energy attributes of electricity generation. 
D.    States Have Subsidized Market Players in Other 
Industries Through Similar Means that Are 
Permissible Under the Commerce Clause 
Subsidizing nuclear is nothing new; the reactors were built on 
the backs of taxpayers and ratepayers, enjoying government 
subsidies since their inception over fifty years ago.159 Recently, 
nuclear power was included in Ohio’s RPS, with half the mandate 
being met by “advanced nuclear reactors.”160 Similar proposals 
were considered in several other states.161 “Sixteen states have 
policies in place that support the development of new reactors, 
including recovery of preconstruction costs and [Construction 
Work in Progress] (“CWIP”), though the specific policies and cost-
recovery mechanisms may vary from state to state.”162 CWIP is a 
mechanism employed by some regulators to allow ongoing projects 
“to be included in [the] rate base during the construction period.”163 
The project owner is also allowed to earn a current return in the 
revenue requirement; the high capital costs of projects such as 
nuclear made this an issue for nuclear projects in the 1980s that 
never saw completion.164 For example, the Texas Economic 
Development Act empowers “local school districts to grant 
subsidies to businesses within their district through deferral of the 
school-tax portion of property taxes.”165 In 2007, nuclear power 
plant projects were made eligible, and by 2009 it became the 
second-largest energy-sector beneficiary in Texas.166 However, the 
 
159. DOUG KOPLOW, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: NUCLEAR POWER: STILL 
NOT VIABLE WITHOUT SUBSIDIES 1 (2011), https://perma.cc/W2E8-XUCR.  
160. Id. at 24. 
161. Id. These states included Florida, Indiana, South Carolina, and West 
Virginia. Id. 
162. Id. at 37. 
163. LAZAR, supra note 29, at 60. 
164. Id. 
165. KOPLOW, supra note 159, at 52. 
166. Id. The gross projected tax abatements exceed $500 million and represent 
nearly one-fourth of all benefits funded by Texas over the past eight years. 
Id. at tbl.13. 
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Texas school district subsidies were intended for bringing 
manufacturing and research jobs into the state, rather than 
nuclear power.167 State subsidies are certainly not exclusive to the 
nuclear plant construction context, with programs and 
mechanisms employed across various state industries. 
The Texas Economic Development Act provides one such 
example where a state exercised its power to subsidize market 
participants in other industries, albeit one that also was 
manipulated to subsidize solar. Tax abatements, such as tax free 
holidays (which started in 1997 in New York and expanded to 
twenty states by 2007), are one such method to support state 
economies.168 New York began its sales tax holiday to help clothing 
retailers compete against stores in neighboring New Jersey, where 
clothes are not subject to the sales tax.169 Currently, sixteen states 
and Puerto Rico employ some form of a tax holiday.170 The practice 
has occurred for twenty years, despite New York explicitly seeking 
to favor its businesses over New Jersey’s in 1997. The lack of 
Commerce-Clause-invoked federal intervention lies in part with 
the inherent power of states to tax within their borders. 
While the Commerce Clause broadly confers upon Congress 
the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among 
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” it leaves out 
language concerning intrastate commerce,171 thus often conflicting 
with the equally weighted Tenth Amendment.172 Regarding a 
state-imposed sales tax, the Tenth Amendment wins.173 The 
 
167. Id. 
168. Nathan Marwell & Leslie McGranahan, The Effect of Sales Tax Holidays on 
Household Consumption Patterns 3-4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., Working 
Paper No. 2010-06, 2010), https://perma.cc/CVT9-5JKQ.  
169. Id. at 3.  
170. Sales Tax Holiday Chart By State, SALES TAX INSTITUTE, 
https://perma.cc/ZL9P-ZCH7.   
171. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
172. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the 
states respectively, or to the people.”). 
173. Cari Beth Janssen, (Un)Happy Holidays: The True Meaning of Sales Tax 
“Holiday” Policy, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 412, 413–14 (2012). There is no 
federal sales tax, meaning that without that power being specifically 
granted to the federal government, “states are free to impose tax on 
individuals using goods, or retailers providing goods, within the boundaries 
of that state.” Id. (referencing U.S. CONST. amend. X.).  
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Supreme Court has long upheld sales taxes as a valid exercise of 
state power, despite the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine174: 
“The central rationale [of the dormant Commerce Clause] is to 
prohibit state or municipal laws whose object is local economic 
protectionism, laws that would excite those jealousies and 
retaliatory measures the Constitution was designed to prevent.”175 
However, “the dormant Commerce Clause does not prevent states 
from creating incentive structures to attract certain kinds of 
business.”176 
It appears that Tier 3 of the CES does not discriminate against 
interstate commerce on its face, and thus, is not invalid per se.177 
Therefore, notwithstanding the court’s conclusion in Coalition for 
Competitive Electricity that New York acted as a market 
participant rather than as a regulator,178 a potential violation, if 
any, by the ZEC program under a dormant Commerce Clause 
analysis may be governed by the test outlined by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.179 
Under Pike, a state statute which may have an indirect effect 
on interstate commerce (but does not directly discriminate) may be 
 
174. See Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 90–93 (1940) (holding that a 
Kentucky bank deposit tax did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment 
because the use of banks was not “a privilege of national citizenship,” and 
that, as long as state policies were constitutional, “the power of the state 
over taxation is plenary”); see also Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 
U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977) (holding that a “privilege of doing business” tax by 
a state within its borders, even when part of a multi-state transaction, does 
not violate the Commerce Clause); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal 
Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 45 (1940) (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 187 
(1824)) (holding that states may constitutionally levy taxes, so long as the 
tax does not interfere with interstate commerce). 
175. Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 43 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1176 (D. Colo. 2014) 
(citing C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)). 
Interesting for the purposes of this Note, Epel involved a dispute in the 
energy industry over whether Colorado could require utilities operating in 
the state to obtain an increasing proportion of their electricity from 
renewables. Id. The plaintiffs ultimately failed to show that Colorado 
violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Id.  
176. Id. at 1180. 
177. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding 
that state statutes which clearly discriminate against interstate commerce 
are virtually invalid per se). 
178. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, No. 16-CV-8164, 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 116140, at *63 (S.D.N.Y. Jul. 25, 2017). 
179. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
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invalid if the “burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly 
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”180 Put 
differently, the Seventh Circuit, citing Pike, stated that “where the 
statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local 
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only 
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such 
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local 
benefits.”181 The Second Circuit, which would have jurisdiction 
should any litigation concerning the ZEC program be removed to 
federal court and later appealed, has also heard cases applying the 
Pike test. In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and found that, 
under Pike, Section 1399-II of New York’s Public Health Law, 
which prohibited cigarette sellers from shipping and transporting 
cigarettes directly to New York consumers, did not violate the 
dormant Commerce Clause.182 There, the court opined that the 
Pike balancing test “does not invite courts to second-guess 
legislatures by estimating the probable costs and benefits of the 
statute,” and that under Sorrell, “a burden that seems 
incommensurate to the statute’s gains survives Pike as long as it 
affects intrastate and interstate interests similarly—the similar 
effect on interstate and intrastate interests assuaging the concern 
that the statute is designed to favor local interests.”183 
Furthermore, in upholding the prohibition, the Second Circuit 
found that “the [s]tatute, at most, incidentally affects interstate 
commerce.”184 
Much more recently and within the energy context, the Second 
Circuit again applied the Pike test in Allco. In addition to its failed 
preemption claims, Allco asserted that the Connecticut DEEP’s 
solicitation process discriminated against its facilities in Georgia 
and New York.185 Connecticut law does not allow non-neighboring, 
out-of-state RECs to count towards Connecticut utilities’ RPS 
requirements and only permits neighboring-state producers to sell 
 
180. Id. 
181. Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pike, 
397 U.S. at 142). 
182. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200, 219 (2d Cir. 
2003). 
183. Id. at 209. 
184. Id. at 217 (emphasis added). 
185. Allco Fin. Ltd. v. Klee, 861 F.3d 82, 93–94 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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RECs to Connecticut utilities after paying transmission fees.186 
Applying Pike to the Georgia facility, the Second Circuit rejected 
both assertions and held that the RPS is facially 
nondiscriminatory; the court reasoned that a Georgia-based 
generator would not transmit electricity to the Northeast-based 
ISO-NE grid for sale.187 Therefore, competition would not be 
unduly undermined by Connecticut’s program.188 Thus, the Second 
Circuit held that the RPS program is not “clearly excessive in 
relation to the putative local benefits” and, thus, passed the Pike 
test in relation to the Georgia facility. The Second Circuit brushed 
aside the allegations concerning the New York facility, 
determining that “Allco has failed sufficiently to plead that such 
[transmission] charges are anything more than use fees, analogous 
to road tolls, which regularly pass constitutional muster.”189 
Ultimately, the courts have demonstrated that incidental effects 
are not enough to fail Pike scrutiny. Because the ZEC program’s 
effects on interstate commerce are de minimis at best, absent 
action by Congress prohibiting the valuation of zero-carbon 
attributes exclusively, the program does not violate the dormant 
Commerce Clause. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The end of nuclear power in New York may be on the horizon, 
but the state’s efforts to stave off the inevitable are by no means 
impermissible. The New York PSC appears ready to defend its two-
pronged position on appeal: (1) that ZECs, like RECs and other 
certificate mechanisms which value non-energy attributes of 
energy production, are legally valid, and (2) because it leaves 
FERC’s wholesale auction scheme undisturbed, it does not go too 
far as to disturb the Commerce Clause. At best, the fact that these 
ZECs enable plants to remain in operation maintains the status 
 
186. Id. 
187. Id. at 103; ISO-NE is the Independent System Operator that is responsible 
for operating the wholesale power market and maintaining the transmission 
network of the New England region. Electric Power Markets: New England 
(ISO-NE), FERC, https://perma.cc/664X-8XLB (last updated Aug. 1, 2017).   
188. Allco Fin. Ltd., 861 F.3d at 106. The court arrived at this conclusion by 
determining that RECs produced by the Georgia facility are dissimilar to 
those produced by generators able to connect to Connecticut’s grid. Id. at 
105; see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 303–04 (1997). 
189. Allco Fin. Ltd., 861 F.3d at 108. 
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quo without substantially altering the wholesale auction scheme. 
As declared in Pike, and elaborated by Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., incidental effects such as these are not enough to 
warrant a finding that the state’s actions intrude on federal 
authority.190 As such, without a valid Commerce Clause argument 
to the contrary, New York is well within its power under the Tenth 
Amendment to regulate in this fashion. 
 
 
190. See discussion of Pike and Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. supra pp. 30–
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